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INTRODUCTION
Most practicing arbitration lawyers have rarely had the occasion to
seek enforcement of an international arbitration award through
national courts. Statistics indicate that the vast majority of defeated
companies comply with the terms of international arbitral awards
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against them or settle soon after the award is rendered.' The United
Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign
Arbitral Awards (the "New York Convention" or the "Convention")
contributes to this compliance by obligating member nations to
enforce awards rendered outside their territory, as long as they meet
certain requirements (generally procedural in nature).2 The New
York Convention, currently with over 130 member nations, has
become one of the most widely-ratified treaties in the world.' Such
breadth ensures, with relative certainty, that the losing party to
arbitration will sooner or later have its assets rooted out by the victor,
identified in some comer of the world subject to the strictures of the
New York Convention and seized through a swift proceeding that is
extremely difficult to deflect.
Enforcing arbitration awards under the Convention, however,
necessarily implicates domestic courts.4 National courts become
1. See ALAN REDFERN & MARTIN HUNTER, LAW AND PRACTICE OF
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 443 *3d ed. 1999) (a successful party
in an international commercial arbitration proceeding expects that the award will
be carried out in a reasonable time, and observing that statistics imply most awards
are in fact carried out voluntarily). However, statistics on this topic are hard to
obtain because arbitration is confidential and because the arbitral tribunal does not
assist in enforcing the decision. Id.
2. See United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of
Foreign Arbitral Awards, June 10, 1958, art. 1, 330 U.N.T.S. 38, reprinted in
International Handbook on Commercial Arbitration, Supp. 29 (J. Paulsson ed.,
1999) [hereinafter New York Convention] (each Contracting State must recognize
arbitral awards as binding and enforceable, as long as the awards meet certain
procedural requirements).
3. See Status of Conventions and Model Laws, sec. 1.9, United Nations
Commission on International Trade Law ("UNCITRAL") [hereinafter Status of
Conventions] (identifying in chart form the 134 Member States, together with
when they signed, ratified, and put the Convention into force), at
www.uncitral.org/english/status/status-e.htm (last visited Feb. 21, 2005).
4. Cf Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States
and Nationals of Other States, Aug. 27, 1965, art. 54, 17 U.S.T. 1270, 29
[hereinafter Washington Convention] (unlike the New York Convention's
enforcement provisions, the Washington Convention employs direct
implementation of investment arbitration awards rendered under the Convention).
See Liberian Eastern Timber Corp. v. Liberia, 650 F. Supp. 73, 76 (S.D.N.Y. 1986)
(maintaining that Contracting 'States shall recognize as binding any awards
rendered under the Washington Convention); see also Aron Broches, Cour de
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involved most commonly at one of three stages of the arbitration
process: at the outset of the dispute, to enforce the agreement to
arbitrate; during the arbitration proceedings, through requests for
interim measures or assistance with evidence-gathering; and after the
close of arbitration to either enforce or annul the final award.' Court
intervention is necessary to some degree to avoid abuse and injustice,
but courts that are too invasive frustrate the parties' will and hamper
international commerce.6  While recognition of international
arbitration awards pursuant to the New York Convention has
generally been uniform worldwide, a few recent cases demonstrate
that national courts still retain the power to sabotage enforcement
despite the Convention's requirements.' These cases could erode
confidence in the international arbitral process, raising doubts as to
the advantages of resolving international commercial disputes
through arbitration.8
Historically, Indonesian courts have engendered little confidence
among foreign investors that the dispute resolution systems they and
their Indonesian partners devise in their contracts will be given full
Cassation 11 juin 1991 Socit6 SOABI v. lktat du S~n~gal, REVIEW DE
L'ARBITRAGE 637, 637-38 (1991) (the Washington Convention limits the power of
judges in each Contracting State to control the arbitration award).
5. See Mark Kantor, Local Court Intervention in International Arbitration, 1
OIL, GAS AND ENERGY LAW INTELLIGENCE 2, March 2003 (discussing how recent
rulings in domestic courts demonstrate local project participants' and government
agencies' ability to usurp arbitrators' authority by seeking court invalidation of
underlying contracts).
6. See id. (while courts base their interventions on widely supported legal
doctrines, international project participants may fear the prospect of local court
action, as hard assets and contract rights may be "held hostage" to compliance).
7. See generally William A. Isaacson, Enforcement Difficulties are
Increasing, 25 NAT'L LAW L.J. 89 (2002) (discussing how the New York
Convention binds countries all over the world to enforce foreign arbitral awards
although recent enforcement difficulties have undermined uniform application).
8. See Nicholas Stone, Indonesia: Arbitrating Indonesian Disputes,
INDONESIA ACADEMIC ENHANCEMENT PROGRAM, Oct. 25, 2001 (the efficiency and
reliability of the arbitration process depends in part on "the extent of support and
recognition that it receives in the laws of the place where the arbitration is
proceeding, or where an award is to be enforced"), at
http://www.east.asu.edu/msabr/research/indonesia/iradru/stone.htm (last visited
Feb. 21, 2005).
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effect when a conflict ultimately arises.9 It is well-known that local
courts frequently penetrate the arbitral process-adjudicating cases
subject to arbitration agreements, enjoining ongoing proceedings,
and reopening the merits of final awards.10
Indonesia passed a new arbitration law in 1999, inspiring a great
deal of optimism.1" On its face, the new law offered predictability
and harmonization with global standards, which could have helped
draw indispensable foreign capital back to the country after the 1997-
1998 financial crisis.1 2 To date, however, the implementation record
of the 1999 legislation has been sobering.13
The case of Karaha Bodas Company LLC ("KBC") v. Perusahaan
Pertambangan Minyak Dan gas Bumi Negara ("Pertamina "') is
sadly emblematic of the continuing problems in enforcing arbitral
agreements and awards. After an ICC tribunal ordered Pertamina to
pay $261 million to Karaha Bodas Company LLC as compensation
for canceling a power project in 1998, in the wake of the Asian
financial crisis, Pertamina refused to comply. 4 Pertamina sought to
annul the award in Switzerland, the arbitration's venue.'5 The Swiss
court rejected Pertamina's application twice, without ever reaching
the merits. 16 When KBC began to enforce the award by seizing assets
in the United States, Hong Kong, Singapore, and Canada, Pertamina
9. See id. (underlining the Dutch Colonial Code's inadequacy in preventing
courts from interfering with arbitration processes). Until recently, the Dutch
Colonial Code governed the arbitration process in Indonesia. Id.
10. Id.
11. See id. (noting that the new Indonesian law on arbitration was designed to
stop judicial interference; in fact the law clearly states that the District Court has
no authority in disputes involving arbitration agreements).
12. See generally id. (explaining the impetus for the new law and some of its
features).
13. See id. (suggesting that recent actions prove the courts will still interfere in
some arbitration processes, despite the new law).
14. See generally Karaha Bodas Co. v. Perusahaan Pertambangan Minyak Dan
Gas Bumi Negara, 335 F.3d 357, 360-63 (5th Cir. 2003) [hereinafter Karaha
Bodas 1].
15. Id. at 361. Pertamina appealed to the Supreme Court of Switzerland to have
the award annulled. Id.
16. Id. at 361 n.9.
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turned to its home courts in Indonesia. The state-owned oil giant
petitioned the Jakarta Central District Court to annul the award under
Indonesian law.17 In the Karaha Bodas case, the central problems of
the old arbitration legislation arose once again-Indonesian courts
asserted jurisdiction over an arbitration the parties had explicitly
sought to isolate from its power, and then annulled an award on
unpredictable and unprincipled grounds."8 Indonesia's reputation in
the international community, not only as a participant in the
arbitration regime, but also as a locale for foreign investment, will
likely decline further in light of the Karaha Bodas vacatur.' 9 How
could the adoption of a reasonably modem arbitration law have made
so little difference to the Indonesian court? Answering this is
important because the success of international commercial arbitration
as a system depends in large part on predictability at the enforcement
stage.Z°
This article explains why the Jakarta Central District Court's
Karaha Bodas award of vacatur violated the spirit and letter of the
New York Convention, and how, in the end, that court's decision
will have little effect outside of Indonesia. Part II provides an
overview of past and current Indonesian arbitral law.21 Part III
presents the facts of the Karaha Bodas case and the contours of the
related enforcement litigation.22 Next, Part IV examines the
17. Id. at 361.
18. Stone, supra note 8. This decision contradicts the international view that
arbitration clauses are separate from the contract and therefore binding, even if the
contract is invalid. Id.
19. See, e.g., U.S. DEPT. OF STATE, BACKGROUND NOTE: INDONESIA (Aug.
2004) (noting that Indonesia has made significant changes to its regulatory
framework since the late 1980s in an effort to encourage economic growth, which
was previously financed largely through both domestic and foreign private
investments), at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/274 8 .htm (last visited Feb. 21,
2005); see also Stone, supra note 8 (the Karaha Bodas decision was a
discouraging first test for the new law because the court refused to follow the
accepted international view on arbitration).
20. See id. (noting that the reason arbitration is usually more preferable than
the courts is because the courts are unpredictable and generally lack the expertise
needed to correctly decide the case).
21. See infra notes 25-79 and accompanying text.
22. See infra notes 80-154 and accompanying text.
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procedure for enforcement actions under the New York Convention
and its relationship to enforcement and annulment proceedings under
Indonesian arbitral law. 3 Finally, Part V explores the reasons for the
1999 law's failure and suggests ways in which it could be
improved. 4
I. INDONESIA'S LEGISLATION ON ARBITRATION
A. INDONESIA'S ARBITRATION TRADITIONS
The principal sources of commercial arbitration law in Indonesia
are traditional norms known as the pancasila, the colonial Code of
Civil Procedure, the Indonesian Civil Code, and, most recently, Law
No. 30 of 1999.25 Historically, each of these sources' peculiarities,
and their occasionally conflicting demands, have hobbled the
development of clear and predictable rules concerning enforcement
of foreign awards in Indonesia.26
Traditionally, Indonesian society is somewhat "non-litigious;"
Indonesians are thought to prefer amicable dispute settlement
through negotiation, and value greatly the preservation of
commercial relationships .2  This consensual approach finds
inspiration in the pancasila (the "five pillars"), an influential body of
traditional philosophy that calls for avoiding confrontation whenever
possible. 28 From a legal standpoint, those legal scholars and judges
23. See infra notes 156-247 and accompanying text.
24. See infra notes 248-253 and accompanying text.
25. Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation ("APEC"), A Guide to Arbitration and
ADR in APEC Member Economies (Indonesia) [hereinafter APEC Guide to
Arbitration], at http://www.arbitration.co.nz (last visited Feb. 21, 2005).
26. See Karen Mills, Enforcement of Arbitral Awards in Indonesia, 6 INT'L
ARB. L.R. 192, 193 (2000) (although the Indonesian Civil Code provided that
foreign judgments-which most commentators agree include arbitration awards-
cannot be enforced, the New York Convention, which Indonesia has ratified,
specifically called for enforcing such foreign awards).
27. See id. at 195 (in Indonesia, confrontation is usually avoided; but when
commercial disputes do arise, they are typically simple matters that parties can
settle through negotiation).
28. See C.G. de Souza and M.A. Karolewski, Dispute Resolution in Indonesia
1 (identifying five sources upon which Indonesian law is based), at
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who closely adhere to pancasila promote such alternative dispute
resolution ("ADR") forms as mediation and conciliation or
consensus building, rather than arbitration-the more adversarial
approach.2 9
Until 1999, Indonesia's arbitration legislation was a jumble of
provisions dating back to the colonial period and based squarely on
early twentieth-century Dutch models.3" The Indonesian Constitution
of 1945 stipulated that the laws of the Netherlands would remain
valid so long as they did not contradict the Constitution, or until they
were superseded by new local laws.3 Articles 615-651 (Title I) of
the Dutch colonial Code of Civil Procedure, together with the
general freedom of contract provisions of the Indonesian Civil Code,
formed the legislative basis for arbitration in Indonesia.3"
This legal framework had important shortcomings. The civil
procedure rules contained no express arbitration rules, so Articles
615-651 of the Code provided legitimacy to arbitration only
implicitly.33 Further, there was no clear mandate for recognizing and
http://www.geocities.com/karolewski/indo.pdf (last visited Feb. 21, 2005).
29. See APEC Guide to Arbitration, supra note 25 (explaining that the
philosophy of pancasila favors non-confrontational and consensual settlement of
disputes, such as alternative dispute resolution).
30. See Sudargo Gautama, Indonesia, INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK ON
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION, Supp. 26 at 1 (Paulsson ed.,1998) (discussing how
Indonesian regulations on arbitration, as of 1998, were based on articles introduced
for "Europeans" and "foreign Oriental Chinese" under the Constitution of the
Netherlands).
31. See Mills, supra note 26, at 106 (suggesting that Dutch laws are not
necessarily binding but at least serve as guidance to judges).
32. See id. (explaining that by combining the two Codes, the basis for
arbitration in Indonesia was formed before Indonesia existed as a nation, and that
this foundation was preserved when the new Indonesian Constitution was written).
33. See Mulyana & Jan K. Schaefer, Indonesia's New Framework for
International Arbitration: A Critical Assessment of The Law And Its Application
By The Courts, 17 MEALEY'S INT'L ARB. REP. 39, 40 (2002) [hereinafter Mulyana
& Schaefer, Critical Assessment] (although Indonesia abandoned the Civil Code
after its independence from the Netherlands, Articles 615-651 still governed the
arbitration process de facto because the new procedural rules did not address the
issue).
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enforcing domestic arbitral awards, let alone foreign ones.34 These
deficiencies caused some foreign businesses to question the legal
security of their investments in Indonesia.35
B. PAST PROBLEMS OF ENFORCEMENT
Indonesia's antiquated arbitration legislation led to decades of
problems in enforcing foreign decisions. 36 This legacy is due chiefly
to an article of the Dutch Civil Code stating that judgments of
foreign courts may not be recognized in local courts.37 In the absence
of any express law on arbitration, Indonesian courts interpreted the
Civil Code instruction as extending equally to foreign arbitral
awards.38 The government did not address this dilemma until 1981,
when Indonesia acceded to the New York Convention.39 Clearly, the
34. See id. (observing that the colonial arbitration law did not address a range
of issues often arising during arbitration proceedings, leading to scrutiny by
foreign investors).
35. See Ricardo Simanjuntak, Legal Practitioners and Business Perspectives on
Business Contract Enforceability (June 13, 2002) (recalling that recent conflicts
between foreign investors, state-owned companies and Indonesian businesspeople
have led foreign investors to question whether their investments will be respected
and protected by Indonesian law) (unpublished paper presented in the Seminar on
the Enforceability of Business Contracts in Indonesia, on file with the American
University International Law Review).
36. Mills, supra note 26, at 106. For at least ten years after Indonesia signed
the New York Convention in 1981, courts remained reluctant to enforce foreign
awards. Id.
37. See BURGELJKE REGLEMENT OF DE RECHTSVORDERING [hereinafter RV]
art. 463 (Neth.), in Karen Mills, Judicial Attitudes to Enforcement of Arbitral
Awards and other Judicial Involvement in Arbitration in Indonesia, 68 ARB. 106
(2002) (Article 463 of the RV provides that Indonesia will not enforce foreign
court judgments).
38. Mulyana & Jan K. Schaefer, Indonesia's New Arbitration Law: Salient
Features and Aberrations in the Application, 2002 INT'L A.L.R. 41 [hereinafter
Mulyana & Schaefer, Salient Features]. This uncertainty stemmed from
Indonesia's ostensible abandonment of the RV, which originally applied to legal
matters that affected Europeans in Indonesia. Id. After abandoning the RV, only
the procedural rules pertaining to arbitration that applied to indigenous Indonesians
remained in force. Id. As a result, Articles 615-651 of the RV continued to govern
arbitration in Indonesia defacto. Id.
39. Mills, supra note 26, at 193; see APEC Guide to Arbitration, supra note 25
(Indonesia ratified the New York Convention subject to two reservations:
366 [20:359
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Civil Code's standing interpretation was irreconcilable with that
treaty's pro-enforcement obligations.40 Indonesia's ratification of the
Convention created high expectations among foreign investors, who
believed the action signified a turning point for enforcing foreign
arbitral awards there.41
However, in the decade following ratification, local courts
remained reluctant to enforce foreign arbitral awards against
Indonesian nationals. In the 1984 Navigation Maritime Bulgare v.
P. T. Nizwar case, for example, the Indonesian Supreme Court's
decision put the New York Convention's applicability into serious
doubt.42 In Bulgare, the Court declared that foreign arbitral awards
remained unenforceable in Indonesia because the government had
failed to pass implementing regulations explaining to courts how
they were to apply the New York Convention. 43 Arbitration scholars
around the world denounced this ruling because it clearly
contradicted the terms of the New York Convention, which requires
contracting States to "recognize as binding and enforce" foreign
"(i) arbitration awards that can be executed in Indonesia must relate to commercial
disputes; and (ii) recognition of awards had to be on the basis of reciprocity, i.e.
rendered in a country which together with Indonesia, is a party to an international
convention regarding implementation of foreign arbitral awards").
40. See id. (comparing the Code of Civil Procedure's mandate that foreign-
rendered arbitration awards cannot be enforced in Indonesia with Article III of the
New York Convention, "which provides that every Contracting State must
recognise [sic] and enforce awards rendered in other Contracting States without
imposing substantially more onerous conditions that are imposed upon recognition
or enforcement of domestic awards").
41. Mulyana & Schaefer, Salient Features, supra note 38, at 61. However, the
Indonesian Supreme Court soon thereafter refused to enforce a foreign award in
Navigation Maritime Bulgare, thus making clear that despite signing the New
York Convention, Indonesia was not ready to enforce all foreign awards. Id.
42. See Mahkamah Agung [Supreme Court], 20 August 1984, on file with
author (holding that although Indonesia had ratified the New York Convention, it
was not yet bound by its provisions).
43. See SuP. CT. REG. 1 (1990) (Indon.), reprinted in INTERNATIONAL
HANDBOOK ON COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION, Supp. 13 (J. Paulsson ed., 1992)
[hereinafter 1990 REGULATION] (regulations should be promulgated concerning the
enforcement procedure for foreign arbitral awards).
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arbitral awards." Thus, Bulgare did little to reassure foreign
businesses that Indonesia would respect their contracts.
Not until 1990 did the Supreme Court issue the landmark
Regulation No. 1 ("the Regulation"), establishing an implementing
procedure for enforcing foreign awards.45 Indonesian authorities
praised the Regulation as a breakthrough, hoping it would restore
investor confidence in the legal system.46 Unfortunately, within a
short time, it became obvious that both the New York Convention
and Regulation No. 1 were failing to correct Indonesia's enforcement
problems. For instance, Regulation No. 1 neglected to set a time limit
within which the Supreme Court would rule on applications for
enforcement. 47 This omission often resulted in foreign arbitral awards
being docketed along with the Court's normal case-load, thus
creating enormous delays.48 Similarly, the Regulation provided no
clear limits upon court intervention, an oversight that enabled local
judges to derail international arbitrations involving Indonesian
respondents.49 Such flaws only served to deepen the recognized
problem of rampant corruption within the Indonesian bench,50 and
"inroads were opened for the Indonesian courts to adversely interfere
in international arbitrations."5
44. New York Convention, supra note 2, at art. III.
45. See Duane J. Gingerich, Indonesia to Enforce Foreign Arbitral Awards, 12
E. ASIAN EXEC. REP., at 9 (nearly six years after the Bulgare decision, the Supreme
Court finally issued long-awaited regulations to establish enforcement procedures).
46. Id. at 13.
47. Mills, supra note 37, at 107.
48. See Mills, supra note 26, at 194 (the Court acted on the first nine
applications, received between 1991 and 1993, with reasonable speed, but the court
did not issue any orders between 1994 and 2000, leaving seven applications
pending).
49. Mulyana & Schaefer, Critical Assessment, supra note 33, at 40.
50. See Oliver Wright and Andi Zulfikar, Indonesian Dispute Resolution, April
2002 (suggesting that corruption within the Indonesian courts is reinforced by
lawyers, judges, prosecutors, and the police), at
http://www.dentonwildesapte.com/assets/l/IndonesianDisputeResAprO2.pdf (last
visited Feb. 21, 2005). It is widely considered that the Indonesian courts are in a
"sorry state" due to corruption. Id.
51. Mulyana & Schaefer, Critical Assessment, supra note 33, at 40.
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Aside from these enforcement problems, Indonesia's legal reforms
failed to respond to numerous other arbitration-related issues. For
example, they did not codify any policy in favor of enforcing
agreements to arbitrate, define the scope of party autonomy, or
enumerate the grounds and procedures for challenging an arbitrator.52
Legislative silence on these and other pressing matters resulted in
confusion among Indonesian justices; with no legislative solution to
these issues throughout the mid-1990s, foreign expectations for an
improved arbitration system quickly dissipated.53
C. LAw No. 30 OF 1999
In 1997, the looming economic crisis and the continuing
uncertainty surrounding Indonesia's arbitration regime renewed calls
for fundamental reform of the country's arbitration laws.54 Local
commentators pushed to "modernize" the arbitration regime, to make
the prospect of doing business in Indonesia more palatable.5 The
result was the Law Concerning Arbitration and Alternative Dispute
Resolution, No. 30 of 1999 (the "1999 Law" or "Law No. 30").56 The
Indonesian legislature designed this new law to repair the former
system's ambiguities, particularly in connection with the
enforcement of foreign arbitral awards.57 In drafting the 1999 Law,
Indonesia departed from its Southeast Asian neighbors, which chose
52. Id. at 41, 61-62.
53. See Mills, supra note 26, at 194 (noting that because the Supreme Court
has failed to act on an application since mid-1994 and the first order under the
Regulation was later nullified by the Supreme Court, Indonesia earned "a negative
reputation in arbitration circles").
54. See Mulyana & Schaefer, Critical Assessment, supra note 33, at 40
(suggesting that the impetus for arbitration reform in Indonesia came from the
International Monetary Fund, which took the position that reform would make
Indonesia a more investment-friendly environment and that it would provide a
workable solution until the country's court system could be modernized).
55. See id. (noting that as the country attempted to attract investment, "the
suitability of Indonesia's framework for arbitration was scrutinized by foreign
investors and modernization was recommended").
56. Law No. 30 of 1999 (Indon.), reprinted in 17 MEALEY'S INT'L ARB. REP.
A-i (2002) [hereinafter Law No. 30].
57. Mulyana & Schaefer, Critical Assessment, supra note 33, at 40.
2005]
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to adopt the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial
Arbitration (the "Model Law").58 Instead, the legislature created an
independent set of rules applicable to national and international
arbitration, different from both the Model Law and the previous legal
framework.59 The law is founded on civil law notions that arbitration
is an out-of-court process for settling private disputes.6 °
Chapters I through IV of Law No. 30 deal with general principles
and the procedures to be followed by arbitrators absent party
agreement.6" Chapters V, VI, and VII deal with the making of
awards, recognition and enforcement of awards, and annulment of
awards, respectively.62
Chapter VI of Law No. 30 first provides for the enforcement of
domestic arbitral awards. To be enforceable, an award must be
"delivered and registered by the arbitrator or his attorney-in-fact to
the Clerk of the District Court" within thirty days of the date the
award was "pronounced."63 If the requirements for registering the
award are not met, Article 59(4) provides that "the arbitral award
shall not be enforceable."' The second part of Chapter VI provides
for the enforcement of international arbitral awards. The competent
authority to enforce the foreign award is the District Court of Central
58. See Status of Conventions, supra note 3, at sec. 11.10 (listing the states that
have enacted legislation based on the UNCITRAL Model Law, including Hong
Kong, Macau, Thailand, Japan, South Korea, and Singapore).
59. Mulyana & Schaefer, Critical Assessment, supra note 33, at 40-41.
60. Id. at 41.
61. See generally Law No. 30, supra note 56 (defining key terms within the
law, and providing an overview of how to initiate arbitration proceedings).
62. See generally id. chs. V-VII (providing guidelines for the rendering of
arbitration awards and for post-award procedures). Articles 3 and 11 of the new
law clearly exclude local courts from ruling on the merits of arbitrable disputes,
stating that the District Court "shall have no jurisdiction to try disputes between
parties bound by an arbitration agreement" and "shall reject and not interfere in the
resolution of a dispute which has been determined to be resolved through
arbitration." Id. arts. 3, 11.
63. See id. at art. 59(1) (mandating that the arbitrator deliver the original or an
authentic copy of the arbitral award).
64. Id. at art. 59(4).
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Jakarta,65 and the award will be recognized and enforceable if the
following conditions are met: 1) the award was rendered in a country
that is bound with Indonesia to recognize and enforce international
arbitration awards; 2) the dispute is commercial in nature; 3) the
award does not violate ordre public; 4) the Chairman of the District
Court of Central Jakarta issues an exequatur [an authorization of
execution]; and 5) where Indonesia is a party to the dispute, the
Supreme Court of the Republic of Indonesia issues the exequatur. 66
Articles 70 and 71 of Chapter VII provide for the annulment of
arbitral awards. Chapter VII makes no visible distinction between
domestic and international awards. The text of Article 70 provides:
[W]ith regard to an arbitral award, the parties may submit an application for
annulment if the award allegedly contains any of the following elements:
a) letter(s) or document(s) submitted in the examination proceedings, after
the award was rendered, was (were) admitted as forged or declared as
forgeries; b) after the award was rendered, documents which are dispositive
were discovered, which were concealed by the opposing party; or c) the
award was a result of fraud committed by one of the parties during the
examination of the dispute.
6 7
Thus, the grounds for challenging awards under the 1999 Law are
significantly narrower than those contained in the Model Law.68
Article 70 does not appear to allow courts to vacate awards where the
arbitrators have exceeded their powers, or where there is a violation
of Indonesian public policy. Article 71 requires that the moving party
submit an application for annulment within thirty days of having had
65. See id. at art. 65 (declaring the District Court of Central Jakarta to be the
"relevant authority for the recognition and the enforcement of International
Arbitral Awards").
66. See Law No. 30, supra note 56, art. 66 (once the Supreme Court issues the
exequatur, it delegates authority to the District Court of Central Jakarta to execute
it).
67. Id. at art. 70.
68. See Sebastian Pompe and Marie-Christine van Waes, Arbitration in
Indonesia, in INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION IN AsIA, at 3-19 (Philip
J. McConnaughay ed., 2002) (distinguishing other modem arbitration laws, which
include provisions for recourse by the losing party, such as set aside provisions,
from the Law No. 30, which does not).
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the award registered with the Clerk of the District Court, but
curiously sets no deadline for registering the award.69
Law No. 30 does incorporate certain key principles of the Model
Law, such as limited court involvement and finality of awards;70
however, some central aspects of the Model Law are missing, such
as the doctrine of Kompetenz-Kompetenz (the arbitrator's power to
rule upon the extent of his own jurisdiction).71 In addition, many of
the 1999 Law's procedural provisions appear to be mandatory,
constraining the parties' ability to construct a dispute resolution
system that best suits their needs.72
Like many Indonesian statutes, the 1999 Law is accompanied by a
non-binding "Elucidation," designed to guide courts when putting
the text into practice. 73 Frequently, these explanations create as many
problems as they solve.74 On the one hand, the Elucidation extols the
virtues of arbitration and calls for "fundamental changes to the Civil
Procedures Regulation... both philosophically and substantively. '75
At the same time, the Elucidation raises serious doubts that Article
70 of the 1999 Law provides exhaustive grounds for annulment. It
states that annulment is possible for several reasons: "inter alia,"
forged documents, withholding of material documents, and fraud on
the parties.76 The phrase "inter alia" may have been a flourish of
69. Law No. 30, supra note 56, art. 71.
70. Mulyana & Schaefer, Critical Assessment, supra note 33, at 41.
71. Id. at 51. Because of this lacuna, disputes concerning an arbitrator's
jurisdiction often end up in Indonesian courts, creating unnecessary judicial
involvement by judges who "lack expertise in international commercial matters
and have a shattered reputation." Id.
72. Id. at 57. For example, it is unclear whether the arbitrators should honor the
parties' choice of law if it lacks a substantial connection to the contract. Id.
73. Pompe and van Waes, supra note 68, at 2, 3.
74. See, e.g., Karaha Bodas Co. v. Perusahaan Pertambangan Minyak Dan Gas
Bumi Negara, 313 F.3d 70, 87 (2d Cir. 2002).
75. Elucidation to Law of the Republic of Indonesia Number 30 of 1999,
reprinted in 17 MEALEY'S INT'L ARB. REP. A-8, A-9 (2002).
76. See Perusahaan Pertambangan Minyak Dan Gas Bumi Negara (Pertamina)
v. Karaha Bodas Co., No. 86/PDT.G/2002/PN.JKT.PST, Judgment, at 23 (English
translation on file with author) [hereinafter Indonesian Case, Judgment] ("grounds
on which to base a petition for the annulment of an arbitral award are, among
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overly legal language, but as illustrated in the Karaha Bodas case,
described below, the Jakarta District Court seized upon these words
to depart completely from Article 70.
Since Indonesia adopted the 1999 Law, arbitration-related
proceedings have revealed that Indonesia's courts are still finding it
difficult to resist interfering in some cases, leading observers to
wonder whether conditions have changed at all. In a 2000 case, for
example, a Jakarta court ignored a clearly binding arbitration clause
on grounds that the dispute was purely legal, and that arbitration
should only be used to decide technical or "expert" matters. 7 Further,
when the main contract's validity was questioned, the court decided
that it had jurisdiction over the merits of the dispute on grounds that
the arbitration clause was part of the main contract; and since the
main contract was invalid, the arbitration clause therein must also be
null.79
Perhaps the most notorious-and certainly the most
complicated-arbitration matter to test the viability of the 1999 Law
is the case of Karaha Bodas Company, L.L.C. v. Perusahaan
Pertambangan Minyak Dan Gas Bumi Negara ("Karaha Bodas v.
Pertamina"). The Karaha Bodas case revealed that the problems
with Indonesian arbitration law lay as much with the Indonesian
courts as with the 1999 Law.
II. KARAHA BODAS V. PERTAMINA
A. THE KARAHA BODAS PROJECT
Three parties and two contracts lie at the root of the Karaha Bodas
case. KBC is a Cayman Islands company primarily owned by Florida
Power and Light" and Caithness Energy,8" two of America's most
others, as stipulated in Article 70").
77. Id.
78. See id. at 12 (explaining that the arbitral decision should be nullified
because it failed to apply Indonesian Law to resolve the dispute).
79. See id. at 7 (finding the agreement's arbitration clause inoperative and
incapable of being performed because the agreement itself is null and void).
80. FPL Group, About Us, at http://www.fplgroup.com/ about/contents/
aboutus.shtml (last visited Feb. 21, 2005).
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important energy producers and distributors.82  Pertamina is
Indonesia's national gas and oil company;83 PLN is its national
electric company. 4 In November 1994, KBC and Pertamina entered
into a joint operation contract ("JOC") that granted KBC geothermal
development rights in a West Java, Indonesia project.15 KBC and
Pertamina also signed an energy sales contract ("ESC") with PLN in
which PLN agreed to purchase from Pertamina the electrical energy
produced at the Karaha Bodas geothermal facility.86
In September 1997, President Soeharto responded to the looming
Asian financial crisis87 by issuing a decree suspending the KBC
project.88 When KBC protested, Soeharto reversed his decision and
81. Caithness Energy, L.L.C., About Us, at http://www.caithnessenergy.com/
about.html (last visited Feb. 21, 2005).
82. Karaha Bodas Co. v. Perusahaan Pertambangan Minyak Dan Bumi Negara,
190 F. Supp. 2d 936, 939 (S.D. Tex. 2001) [hereinafter Karaha Bodas II1].
83. PT Pertamina (Persero), Company's History, at http://www.pertamina.com/
englishversion/companyprofile/history.html (last visited Feb. 21, 2005); see PT
Pertamina (Persero), Company in Brief (noting that Pertamina has recently become
a Limited Liability Corporation, although it is still state-owned) at
http://www.pertamina.com/englishversion/ companyprofile/brief.html (last visited
Feb. 21, 2005). Pertamina's move to a limited liability enterprise was promulgated
by the passage of Law No. 22/2001 in November 2001 and subsequent
Government Regulation No. 31 in September 2003. Id.
84. PT PLN (Persero), Company Profile, at http://www.pln.co.idlenglish/
companyprofile-energy.asp (last visited Feb. 21, 2005).
85. Karaha Bodas III, 190 F. Supp. 2d at 939-40; see Exclusive Right on
Geothermal Resources Lifted, JAKARTA POST, Aug. 4, 2000.
86. Karaha Bodas III, 190 F. Supp. 2d at 940. See generally E. ALLAN
FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS § 2.15 (2d ed. 1998) (providing an
overview of output and requirement contracts).
87. Embassy of the United States of America, Jakarta, Indonesia, Chronology
of the Crisis [hereinafter Crisis Chronology] at http://www.usembassyjakarta.org/
econ/crisis.html (last visited Feb. 21, 2005); see Meydiatama Suryodiningrat,
APEC Analysts Predict Slower Growth for RI, JAKARTA POST, Nov. 24, 1997,
available at 1997 WL 13541112.
88. See Crisis Chronology, supra note 87 (the Indonesian president suspended
the Karaha Bodas Company ("KBC") project in order to alleviate budgetary
pressures in light of growing debt); see also Karaha Bodas III, 190 F. Supp. 2d at
940 (KBC continued its production schedule because Pertamina and PLN insisted
that the suspension was temporary, even though the presidential decree indefinitely
postponed the project).
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reinstated the project in November 1997. 9 Finally, on January 10,
1998, a third decree postponed the project for good.9° After the third
Presidential Decree, KBC notified Pertamina and PLN on April 30,
1998 that the government's actions "constituted an event of Force
Majeure" under both contracts, ceased operations, and served the
parties with notice of its intent to initiate arbitration.9"
Clauses in each contract provided that the three parties would
arbitrate disputes arising out of the contracts in Geneva, Switzerland,
under the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law
Arbitration Rules ("UNCITRAL Rules"). 92 Both contracts also
provided for the parties' selection of arbitrators within thirty days of
the initiation of arbitration by one of the parties.93 The contracts
added the proviso that if either party failed to appoint its arbitrator
within thirty days, the Secretary General of the International Centre
for Settlement of Investment Disputes ("ICSID")94 would appoint an
arbitrator upon any party's request.95 While the JOC provided that
each party would appoint an arbitrator, the ESC stated that KBC and
Pertamina would jointly appoint an arbitrator, with PLN appointing
89. Karaha Bodas III, 190 F. Supp. 2d at 940.
90. Id. See Crisis Chronology, supra note 87.
91. Karaha Bodas III, 190 F. Supp. 2d at 940; see generally Jennifer M. Bund,
Note and Comment, Force Majeure Clauses: Drafting Advice for the CISG
Practitioner, 17 J.L. & CoM. 381, 399-401 (1998).
92. Karaha Bodas Co. v. Perusahaan Pertambangan Minyak Dan Gas Bumi
Negara, 364 F.3d 274, 282 n.7 (5th Cir. 2004) [hereinafter Karaha Bodas IV].
93. Id.
94. World Bank Group, About ICSID, at http://www.worldbank.org/
icsid/about/main.htm (last visited Feb. 21, 2005). The Convention on the
Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of Other States
created the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes ("ICSID")
and both Indonesia and the United States ratified the Convention. Id. See World
Bank Group, List of Contracting States (Indonesia ratified the Convention in 1968
and the United States ratified the Convention in 1966), available at
http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/constate/c-states-en.htm (last visited Feb. 21,
2005).
95. Karaha Bodas IV, 364 F.3d at 282 n.7.
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the other arbitrator. 96 Both the JOC and the ESC provided that
Indonesian laws would govern each agreement. 97
KBC appointed Professor Piero Bernardini to the arbitration
panel, 98 but Pertamina failed to name an arbitrator within thirty
days. 99 KBC notified ISCID and requested appointment of a second
arbitrator. 100 The ICSID Secretary General did not receive any
objections from Pertamina, 10' and proceeded to appoint Dr. Ahmed
El-Kosheri to the arbitral panel on July 15, 1998.1"2 The two
arbitrators subsequently appointed Yves Derains to serve as panel
Chairman. 03
96. See id. ( "PLN on one hand, and [KBC] and Pertamina on the other hand,
will each appoint one arbitrator ... ").
97. Id. at 291 n.30. See discussion infra Part III.C (reviewing Pertamina's
contention that the application of Indonesian law includes the country's procedural
law, in addition to the uncontested application of Indonesian substantive law).
98. Karaha Bodas III, 190 F. Supp. 2d at 941 n.2.
99. Id. at 940.
100. Id. at 940-41.
101. Id. at941.
102. Id. See Press Release 92/04, International Court of Justice, Questions of
Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention Arising from the
Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Mar. 24, 1992) (describing Dr. El-Kosheri as an
eminent Egyptian attorney and arbitrator, who is well-known in international
arbitration circles for his voluminous writings on international arbitration in the
developing world and his rulings in several important investment arbitrations),
available at http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/ipresscom/1991-1995/ipr9204.html
(last visited Feb. 21, 2005). Dr. EI-Kosheri was Vice Chairman of the ICC's
International Court of Arbitration when the ICSID appointed him as the second
arbitrator. Karaha Bodas III, 190 F. Supp. 2d at 941 n.2.
103. Karaha Bodas III, 190 F. Supp. 2d at 941; see also International Council
for Commercial Arbitration, Officers, Members and Advisory Members (noting
that the Chairman of the arbitration, Yves Derains, is a former Secretary General of
the International Court of Arbitration of the International Chamber of Commerce),
available at http://www.arbitration-icca.org/officers-and-members.htm (last
visited Feb. 21, 2005).
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B. ARBITRATION PROCEEDINGS
Pertamina and PLN jointly submitted preliminary objections to the
arbitral panel's jurisdiction. 0 4 On October 4, 1999, the arbitral panel
issued a Preliminary Award, upholding the formation of the panel
and ruling that KBC permissibly consolidated its JOC and ESC
claims into a single arbitration hearing. 05 In its December 18, 2000
Final Award, the Tribunal held that Pertamina and PLN breached
their contracts with KBC, because they had assumed the risk that
government action would nullify the project. 0 6 The panel awarded
about $261 million in damages, including $111 million in sunk costs
and $150 million in lost profits, plus 4% post-judgment interest.'0 7
C. LEGAL PROCEEDINGS
Pertamina sought to set aside the arbitrators' decision in the Swiss
Supreme Court, pursuant to the law of the place of arbitration
(Switzerland) and the New York Convention. The Swiss court
declined to hear Pertamina's challenge, however, because of a
procedural error in paying court fees on time. 8 After a motion for
104. See Karaha Bodas III, 190 F. Supp. 2d at 941 (PLN and Pertamina argued
that the arbitration panel was improperly formed because the arbitrator nomination
process did not conform to energy sales contract ("ESC") nomination provisions);
see also Karaha Bodas IV, 364 F.3d at 284 (in addition to the arbitrator selection
process, Pertamina objected to the consolidation of KBC's joint operation contract
("JOC") and ESC claims).
105. Karaha Bodas III, 190 F. Supp. 2d at 941.
106. See Karaha Bodas IV, 364 F.3d at 284-85 (the arbitrators interpreted the
provision that PLN and Pertamina accept the risk of losses arising from
"government related event[s]" to mean that the two companies were solely liable
for Indonesian government actions that thwart performance of the ESC and/or
JOC).
107. Karaha Bodas Ill, 190 F. Supp. 2d at 942; see also Karaha Bodas IV, 364
F.3d at 285; Louis T. Wells, Double Dipping in Arbitration Awards? An
Economist Questions Damages Awarded to Karaha Bodas Company in Indonesia
19 ARB. INT'L 471, 471-81 (2003) [hereinafter Double Dipping] (arguing that
damages for expenditure and lost profits are more appropriate in normal sales
transactions, while lost profit damages are less appropriate in foreign direct
investment cases).
108. See Karaha Bodas Co. v. Perusahaan Pertambangan Minyak Dan Bumi
Negara, 264 F. Supp. 2d 470, 473 (S.D. Tex. 2002) [hereinafter Karaha Bodas V]
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reconsideration was denied, the Swiss Supreme Court ultimately
denied the appeal in August 2001.109 Before the Swiss court had
issued its final denial, KBC initiated legal proceedings worldwide to
enforce the Final Award against Pertamina under the New York
Convention."' In February 2001, KBC sought enforcement of the
award under Article V of the New York Convention in the United
States District Court for the Southern District of Texas."' Pertamina
opposed the enforcement of the award on the grounds that 1) the
arbitral proceedings violated the parties' agreement;" 2 2) the arbitral
panel deprived Pertamina of due process in the arbitration;" 3 and 3)
enforcement would constitute a violation of public policy."4 On
December 4, 2001, the district court issued a judgment confirming
the award for enforcement under the New York Convention." 5 The
court upheld the agreement's legality," 6  finding both the
(indicating that the arbitration took place in Switzerland and Pertamina's appeal to
the Swiss Supreme Court was therefore "contemplated" by the New York
Convention).
109. Id.
110. Id. In addition to enforcement actions in the United States, KBC actively
pursued enforcement of the arbitral award in Canada, Hong Kong and Singapore.
11. Id.
112. Karaha Bodas III, 190 F. Supp. 2d at 945.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 945. See New York Convention, supra note 2, at art. V(2)(b)
(stipulating that the laws of the country whose courts adjudicate the enforcement
action determine whether or not the award violates public policy). Compare
Homayoon Arfazadeh, In the Shadow of the Unruly Horse: International
Arbitration and the Public Policy Exception, 13 AM. REV. INT'L ARB. 43, 63-64(2002) (asserting that the public policy exception to enforcement of international
arbitration awards fosters international trade and individual rights), with Report of
the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law on the Work of its
Eighteenth Session, [1985] 16 Y.B. Int'l Trade L. Comm'n 36, U.N. Doc.
A/CN.9/SER.A/1985 (a UNCITRAL proposal to eliminate the public policy
exception from Article V of the New York Convention), available at
http:/www.uncitral.org/english/yearbooks/yb- 1985-e/vol 1 6-p3-46-e.pdf (last
visited Feb. 21, 2005).
115. See Karaha Bodas III, 190 F. Supp. 2d at 957 (ruling that Pertamina failed
to prove any of the defenses provided under the New York Convention, and
denying Pertamina's request to conduct discovery).
116. See id. at 945, 949 (reasoning that the New York Convention's "pro-
enforcement bias" requires the court to deny enforcement only where a procedural
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composition of the arbitral panel 1 7 and the consolidation of the JOC
and ESC arbitration proceedings proper." 8 The court also found that
Pertamina received a fundamentally fair hearing,"19 and that neither
an award of lost profits 20 nor the fact (as Pertamina asserted) that
compliance with the contracts would have contravened Indonesian
law' 2' violated public policy. 22 Pertamina subsequently appealed the
error substantially prejudiced the petitioner, and that Pertamina had failed to prove
substantial prejudice). See also Karaha Bodas Co. v. Perusahaan Pertambangan
Minyak Dan Bumi Negara [2003] 4 HKC 488, 496 [hereinafter Karaha Bodas,
Hong Kong Case] (highlighting that the Hong Kong court's public policy analysis
starts with a pro-enforcement bias). The district court agreed with the United States
District Court for the District of Columbia that Article V(1)(d) of the New York
Convention does not authorize courts to set aside arbitral awards based on minimal
procedural violation. Karaha Bodas III, 190 F. Supp. 2d at 945.
117. See Karaha Bodas III, 190 F. Supp. 2d at 949 (finding that Pertamina did
not prove arbitrator bias, conflict of interest, or lack of neutrality as required to
demonstrate prejudice).
118. See id. at 946-47 (the highly integrated contracts made consolidation
appropriate, and Pertamina failed to demonstrate a prejudicial loss of contract
rights as a result of the consolidation).
119. See id. at 949-54 (neither the arbitral panel's failure to extend discovery nor
its reversal of parts of the Preliminary Award violated Pertamina's due process
rights, which included receiving adequate notice, an evidentiary hearing, and an
impartial decision).
120. See id. at 954-57 (confirming that while Pertamina failed to prove that the
"abuse of rights" doctrine is part of United States jurisprudence, Pertamina also
provided no evidence refuting KBC's reasonable interest in asserting lost profits
rights for compensatory purposes). Compare id. at 957 (quoting the proposition
that limiting victims' awards to actual expenditure "transform[s] [the victim] into a
lender, which is commercially intolerable when the party was at full risk for the
amount of the investments made on the strength of the contract"), with Double
Dipping, supra note 107, at 471-81 (disputing the validity of KBC's lost profits
award as a fair means of compensatory damages).
121. See Karaha Bodas III, 190 F. Supp. 2d at 954-57 (reasoning that the Final
Award merely obligated Pertamina to uphold its contractual assumption of the risk
for "government related events," which is different than explicitly mandating
defiance of Indonesian law).
122. See id. at 954, 957 (indicating that public policy violations require proof of
results contrary to "basic notions of morality and justice," and that Pertamina had
failed to meet this standard).
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confirmation judgment to the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit. 123
Nearly three months after the district court ordered the award
enforceable under the Convention, Pertamina petitioned the District
Court of Central Jakarta for both injunctive relief against KBC's
enforcement actions and annulment of the Swiss Award. 124 In its
challenge to the Indonesian court, Pertamina argued inter alia that
the arbitral panel exceeded its authority by failing to apply
Indonesian law; 25 that the panel failed to correctly interpret
Indonesian law on the issue of force majeure;126 that the award
violated Indonesian public policy; 27 and that KBC failed to give
Pertamina proper notice of the appointment of arbitrators. 28 In reply,
KBC argued, inter alia, that the petition for annulment had no legal
basis since the grounds for annulment under Indonesian law were not
met; the annulment application was premature since the award had
not been registered as required by Indonesian law; and Pertamina's
claim was obscure and ambiguous because it was unclear whether
Pertamina was requesting annulment of the JOC and ESC, or the
Swiss Award itself. 29 On April 1, 2002 the Indonesian court issued
123. Karaha Bodas V, F. Supp. 2d at 473.
124. See Perusahaan Pertambangan Minyak Dan Bumi Negara v. Karaha Bodas
Co., Case No. 86/PDT.G/2002/PN.JKT.PST, Preliminary Award, April 2, 2002,
Claimant's Arguments, 68 [hereinafter Indonesian Case, Final Award](requesting that the Indonesian court fine KBC if it takes steps to enforce an
arbitration award that Pertamina believes the court will annul once it has a chance
to examine the case), available at http://www.lfip.org/lawe506/
documents/sessionl4/e5O6kbjakartadctprelim.doc (last visited Feb. 21, 2005) (on
file with American University International Law Review).
125. Id. 11-14. Contra Karaha Bodas IV, 364 F.3d at 292 (holding that
intermittent contractual references to Indonesian procedural rules cannot rebut the
strong presumption that the procedural rules of the country hosting the arbitration
proceedings control).
126. Indonesian Case, Final Award, Case No. 86/PDT.G/2002/PN.JKT.PST,
15-22.
127. Id. 22-28.
128. Id. 32-33.
129. See Indonesian Case, Judgment, 86/PDT.G/2002/PN.JKT.PST, at 12-20
(noting the factors Indonesian courts must consider before annulling an arbitral
award).
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an injunction in Pertamina's favor, barring KBC from attempting to
enforce the arbitration award and imposing a $500,000 per day
penalty for any KBC non-compliance (the "Indonesian
Injunction"). 30
The Indonesian court issued the injunction shortly after the Texas
district court had issued a temporary restraining order ("TRO")
requiring Pertamina to withdraw its Indonesian court petition against
KBC. 13' On April 2, 2002, the Texas district court found Pertamina
in contempt for failing to comply with the TRO,I32 and again ordered
Pertamina to withdraw its injunctive relief request from the
Indonesian court.'33 Finally, on April 26, 2002, the district court
granted KBC's Motion for Preliminary Injunction, and ordered
Pertamina to refrain from taking action to prosecute or enforce the
Indonesian Injunction.14  The Preliminary Injunction, which
superseded the previous TRO and contempt order, also forbade
Pertamina from collecting money for KBC non-compliance with the
Indonesian court's ruling.'35
In August 2002, the District Court of Central Jakarta rendered a
final judgment after considering Pertamina's preliminary injunction
arguments, KBC's arguments in response to the interim judgment,
and the parties' additional arguments on the merits of the case.
13 6
130. Id. at 12.
131. Karaha Bodas V, 264 F. Supp. 2d at 473.
132. Id. at 474.
133. Id. at 474 n.3.
134. Id. at 483.
135. Id. Pertamina appealed the contempt order to the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. Karaha Bodas I, 335 F. 3d at 374. The appellate
court ruled in Pertamina's favor, finding that international comity would be
harmed by the district court's interference with the legal proceedings of a foreign
sovereign, and that this concern outweighed the need to "prevent vexatious and
oppressive foreign litigation" in this case. Id. at 366-74. See generally 5th Circuit
Reverses, Vacates Preliminary Injunction in Pertamina, MEALEY'S INT'L ARB.
REP., June 2003, at 6, 6-10 (reviewing the main issues surrounding the appellate
court's reversal, including the district court's authority to issue an injunction and
whether Pertamina's appeal was moot).
136. See Indonesian Case, Judgment, at 1-21 (recounting the parties'
contentions since Pertamina filed for an injunction and annulment in March 2002,
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The court set aside the arbitral panel's awards, 137 reasoning that
1) the arbitral tribunal had exceeded its authority in failing to apply
Indonesian law; 138 2) the award violated Indonesian ordre public;139
3) the arbitral tribunal erred in its construction of the force majeure
clause under Indonesian laws; 14° 4) the arbitral panel should not have
consolidated the contract disputes; 4' and 5) Indonesian law permits
annulment. 142 In so ruling, the court confirmed its provisional
judgment of April 2, 2002, and concluded that the Final Award was
null and void.143 Ultimately, the Indonesian court's ruling merely
delayed KBC's enforcement efforts.' 44 In Hong Kong, Singapore,
Canada, Texas, and New York, enforcing courts allowed KBC's
execution on Pertamina's assets to proceed. 145
On March 23, 2004, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit affirmed the Texas district court's summary judgment
decision enforcing the award.146 Pertamina argued that the New York
Convention accorded the Indonesian courts "primary jurisdiction"
and reviewing the parties' factual claims about the merits of the case).
137. See id. at 29-30 (declaring the holding immediately enforceable and
ordering KBC to pay Pertamina's court fees).
138. Id. at 26.
139. Id. at 26-27.
140. Id. at 27-28. See generally Crisis Chronology, supra note 87 (recounting
the circumstances contributing to Indonesia's economic climate in 1997).
141. See Indonesian Case, Judgment at 28 (arguing that ICSID should have
appointed different arbitrators for the contract disputes because Pertamina and
PLN had different interests).
142. Id.
143. Id. at 29.
144. See, e.g., supra notes 110-123 and accompanying text (recounting the
United States federal court proceedings dedicated to resolving the litigants' dispute
over the Indonesian court's injunction order).
145. See, e.g., Karaha Bodas, Hong Kong Case, 4 HKC at 497-504 (rejecting
Pertamina's contention that the Indonesian court's annulment precludes
enforcement because Swiss procedural law, not Indonesian law, applies).
146. Karaha Bodas IV, 364 F.3d at 310; see also Chuck Ragan, Karaha Bodas
Co LLC v. Perusahaan Pertambangan Minyak Dan Gas Bumi Negara Et Al, 4
INT'L ARPB. L. REv. N-37, N-43 (2004).
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over the KBC arbitration, 47 empowering them to annul the award
and precluding U.S. court enforcement of the award once so
annulled.'48 According to Article V(1)(e) of the Convention, a court
has primary jurisdiction when the court is located either at the place
of arbitration, or in the country whose procedural law governs the
arbitration proceedings. 149  Pertamina argued that Indonesian
procedural law applied to its arbitration with KBC. 50 The Fifth
Circuit rejected this position, relying upon the strong presumption
that the law applicable to any arbitral procedure is the lex arbitri-
the law of the arbitral situs, which in the KBC case was
Switzerland.'5' Occasional contractual references to certain
Indonesian civil procedure rules were insufficient to rebut this
presumption.' The appellate court held that Switzerland had
primary jurisdiction and the Indonesian courts only secondary
jurisdiction over the proceedings.' The Fifth Circuit also found that
Pertamina was judicially estopped from claiming Indonesian law was
the applicable procedural law, because Pertamina had earlier relied
on the procedural law of Switzerland, not least in bringing its first
147. Id. at 289-90. See Arbitration - Enforcement of Award. Court Enforces
New York Convention Award that Was Annulled by a Foreign Court of Secondary
Jurisdiction, 3 INT'L LITIG. & ARB. NEWSL., July 2004 (reviewing the appellate
court's opinion and noting how Pertamina's contention that the Indonesian court
had primary jurisdiction was a central focus in the case).
148. Karaha Bodas IV, 364 F.3d at 289-90.
149. New York Convention, supra note 2, at art. V; see Karaha Bodas IV, 364
F.3d at 289.
150. Karaha Bodas IV, 364 F.3d at 289-90.
151. Id. at 291-92.
152. See id. at 291 n.30-31 (reviewing several of the agreements' references to
Indonesian civil procedure rules, including Article 13.2 of the JOC and Section 8.2
of the ESC).
153. See id. at 294 (emphasizing that Switzerland is the only country with
primary jurisdiction). Under Article V(1)(e) of the New York Convention it is
theoretically possible that two countries may legally assert primary jurisdiction. Id.
See generally New York Convention, supra note 2, at art. V (indicating that either
a competent authority where the arbitrators rendered an award "or" a competent
authority exercising jurisdiction under the laws governing the arbitration may set
an award aside).
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challenge of the award there.'54 Thus ended Pertamina's battle to
block confirmation of the award in U.S. courts.155
III. FLAWS IN THE INDONESIAN "ANNULMENT"
Pertamina's quest for annulment in Jakarta was not aimed at
blocking enforcement in Indonesia-although this would certainly be
one effect. 156 Rather, the hope was to delay or stop enforcement in
other jurisdictions by operation of the New York Convention.'57
Pertamina's strategy was based on the fact that foreign awards can be
refused by courts in signatory States under Article V of the
Convention where an award has been set aside "by a competent
authority of the country in which, or under the law of which, the
award was made."'58 Pertamina argued that courts in the United
States and elsewhere should not enforce the Swiss Award because
the Jakarta district court had annulled it, and that this court was the
competent authority of the country under the law of which the award
was made. 59 Ultimately, this argument was roundly defeated,
because of the serious flaws in the Jakarta Court's decision. First,
154. See Karaha Bodas IV, 364 F.3d at 293-94 (concluding that Pertamina's
conduct meets the two qualifications of judicial estoppel-party positions that
clearly contradict its prior positions and the court's acceptance of the past,
inconsistent party position). The Fifth Circuit also affirmed the thrust of the district
court's holdings, including finding that the arbitration panel properly consolidated
the ESC and JOC disputes and that Pertamina received a fair hearing. Id. at 296-
304.
155. In fact, the battle to enforce the award against Pertamina's assets continued
for some time in the Federal District Court for the Southern District of New York,
largely based upon the company's arguments that the Government of Indonesia
actually owned the proceeds from Pertamina's production sharing agreements.
Karaha Bodas Co. v. Perusahaan Pertambangan Minyak Dan Bumi Negara, 313
F.3d 70 (2d Cir. 2002).
156. See Karaha Bodas V, 264 F. Supp. 2d at 474 n.3 (explaining that the
Indonesian Injunction issued by the Jakarta court purports to prohibit KBC from
taking actions to enforce the Swiss Award in any jurisdiction).
157. See New York Convention, supra note 2, at art. V (detailing grounds for
supporting a refusal to recognize and enforce an award).
158. Id. at art. V(1)(e).
159. See discussion infra Part III.C (describing the extensive legal proceedings
and Pertamina's various legal assertions).
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Indonesia was not a "primary jurisdiction" authorized under the
Convention to vacate the award.1 60 Second, the "annulment" departed
sharply from the provisions of Law No. 30.161
A. INDONESIA WAS NOT A "COMPETENT AUTHORITY" To VACATE
THE Swiss ARBITRAL AWARD
It seems eminently clear that the Indonesian court was not the
proper location in which to lodge an annulment of the Swiss
award. 62 The Indonesian court made two initial errors with regard to
the applicability and interpretation of the New York Convention.
First, while the Jakarta district court could have applied the
Convention to an enforcement proceeding in Indonesia,163 the
Convention has no place in an action to vacate an award.164 Second,
even assuming the Convention governs annulment proceedings, the
court erred in concluding that the Indonesian court is a "competent
authority" to vacate the Swiss Award under the Convention.1 65
There are only two articles in the Convention that refer to
annulment of an arbitral award-Articles V(l)(e) and VI. 166 The text
of Article V(1)(e) refers to annulment by a "competent authority of
the country in which, or the country under the law of which, the
award was made; ' 167 and Article VI provides:
160. See discussion infra Part IV.A (explaining why Indonesia is not a
"competent authority" to vacate the Swiss arbitral award).
161. See discussion infra Part IV.B (detailing reasons why the "annulment"
departed from Indonesia's Law No. 30).
162. See discussion infra Part IV.A (discussing the New York Convention
articles applicable to annulment actions and Indonesia's improper "annulment" of
the Swiss arbitral award).
163. See New York Convention, supra note 2, at art. I(l) (the Convention
applies to awards made in a territory other than in the territory where the
enforcement of the award is sought).
164. Karaha Bodas V, 264 F. Supp. 2d at 481. Under the New York Convention,
a country's courts may only annul an award if it was issued there, or if it was
issued under the country's arbitral law. Id. at 482.
165. See id. at 482 (confirming that both the physical and legal situs of the
award was Switzerland, not Indonesia).
166. New York Convention, supra note 2, arts. V(1)(e), VI.
167. Id. at art. V(1)(e).
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[I]f an application for the setting aside or suspension of the award has
been made to a competent authority referred to in Article V(1)(e), the
authority before which the award is sought to be relied upon may, if it
considers it proper, adjourn the decision on the enforcement of the
award. 168
It is clear that Articles V and VI distinguish between two sets of
courts: 1) the country of origin's courts, which have "primary"
jurisdiction; and 2) the enforcement courts, where the respondent's
assets are located, which have "secondary" jurisdiction. 69 Thus,
according to Articles V and VI, the same award may either be a
domestic award in the country in which, or under the laws of which it
was made, or a foreign award in any other country. 170 Although the
Convention recognizes these "two faces" of an arbitral award, its
provisions distinguish between foreign and domestic awards,
applying only to the former. 171 In fact, "the New York Convention
does not apply to actions seeking to set aside an award; it is limited
to actions seeking to enforce a foreign award."' 7 2 As such, in the case
between Pertamina and KBC, Pertamina's application for annulment
with the. Indonesian courts should not have been considered to fall
under the New York Convention at all. 73 The Swiss Award was
168. Id. at art. VI.
169. See, e.g., V.S. Deshpande, Jurisdiction Over 'Foreign' and 'Domestic'
Awards in the New York Convention, 1958, 7 ARB. INT'L 123, 126 (1991)
(distinguishing between the powers of these two sets of courts). The courts of the
country of origin can set the award aside, while enforcement courts may only
refuse to enforce the award in their jurisdiction. Id.
170. See id. at 127 (cautioning that some awards issued within the state of
enforcement may not be considered domestic under local law, and might
consequently be enforced as foreign awards).
171. Id. at 126-27.
172. See Albert Jan van den Berg, Court Decisions on the New York Convention,
Consolidated Commentary, Vols. XIII-XIV, 14 Y.B. COM. ARB. 595 (1989)
(providing instances in which courts held that the Convention only applies in
enforcement actions).
173. See id. (explaining that under the New York Convention the only courts
competent to set aside an award are those of the country in which the award was
made, or those of the country under the law of which the award was made).
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certainly a foreign award, but the Convention simply has nothing
directly to say about annulment applications. 174
The Jakarta court's second mistake-accepting jurisdiction to
vacate the Swiss Award-arose out of a misapprehension of the
distinction between the two types of court authority referred to in
Articles V and VI of the Convention. 75 Article V(1)(e) suggests that
the court of origin has the power to vacate the award under its
domestic arbitration laws, a competence again recognized in Article
VI. 176 The enforcement court, meanwhile, cannot set aside the award;
it can only refuse enforcement if the party meets the requirements set
forth in Article V. 177 In fact, "the courts have affirmed the principle
that, according to the Convention, the courts of the country in which,
or under the law of which, the award was made, are exclusively
competent to decide on an action for setting aside the award."' 178
Thus, regarding the power to set aside an award, it is clear that there
are two possible "competent authorities" within the meaning of
Article V(l)(e). 179 The first is a court in the territory where the
arbitrators rendered the award.181 In the case at hand, it was the Swiss
Supreme Court that had authority to vacate the award, since it was
174. See Christopher R. Drahozal, Enforcing Vacated International Arbitration
Awards: An Economic Approach, 11 AM. REV. INT'L ARB. 451, 455 (2000).
175. See Deshpande, supra note 169, at 126.
176. Id.
177. See id. (contrasting the nature of a foreign award to that of a domestic
award).
178. See van den Berg, supra note 172, at 595 (suggesting that once a competent
court sets an award aside, this will preclude enforcement in other states). But
compare Baker Marine (Nig.) Ltd. v. Chevron (Nig.) Ltd., 191 F.3d 194 (2d Cir.
1999) (vacatur at place of arbitration does not necessarily preclude enforcement
elsewhere); see also Hamid Gharavi, The International Effectiveness of the
Annulment of an Arbitral Award 106 (2002) (same); Albert Jan van den Berg,
Enforcement of Annulled Awards?, 9(2) ICC Int'l Ct. of Arb. Bull., November
1998 at 15 (same).
179. See Deshpande, supra note 169, at 126 (confirming that an award may be
set aside by the courts of the country in which, or under the laws of which, the
arbitral award was made).
180. New York Convention, supra note 2, at art. V(1)(e).
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rendered in Switzerland. 8' In fact, it is well settled, in both theory
and practice:
The competent authority [referred to in each Article] for entertaining the
action of setting aside the award is virtually always the court of the country
in which the award was made. The phrase 'or under the law of which' the
award was made refers to the theoretical case that on the basis of an
agreement of the parties the award is governed by an arbitration law which is
different from the arbitration law of the country in which the award was
made. 18
2
Nevertheless, the meaning of the language "or under the laws of
which"'83 contained in Article V(1)(e) is ambiguous. The case law
on the subject however, is now clear-the only place that the parties
may lodge an application for annulment, apart from the courts in the
territory in which the award was rendered, is the country whose
procedural law applied to the arbitration proceedings. 8 4 Not only
does United States case law support this view; various courts around
the world have reached the same conclusion. 85
In International Standard Electric Corp. v. Bridas Sociedad
Anonima Petrolera Industrial y Commercial,8 6 the court directly
confronted the language of Article V(1)(e) 187 The case involved a
contract between an Argentinean (Bridas) and an American company
("ISEC"), which provided for arbitration in Mexico under the local
Rules of Conciliation and Arbitration. 8 8 In addition, the parties
resolved that New York state law would govern the agreement. 89
The parties arbitrated their dispute and the arbitration panel
ultimately issued a final arbitral award in Mexico City against
181. Karaha Bodas V, 264 F. Supp. 2d at 473.
182. International Standard Electric Corp. v. Bridas Sociedad Anonima
Petrolera, Industrial y Comercial, 745 F. Supp. 172, 177 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
183. Id. at 91.
184. Van den Berg, supra note 172, at 595.
185. See discussion infra Part IV.A.
186. 745 F. Supp. 172 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
187. Id. at 178.
188. Id. at 173.
189. Id. at 174.
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ISEC. 9 ° Subsequently, ISEC petitioned the United States District
Court to vacate the award, arguing that under the New York
Convention, courts at both the arbitral situs and the country whose
substantive law applied had jurisdiction to annul the award. 91 The
court referred to the "complex thicket of the procedural law of
arbitration obtaining in the numerous and diverse jurisdictions of the
dozens of nations in attendance at the time the Convention was being
debated," and held that the phrase "under the laws of which" in
Article V(1)(e) referred to the procedural and not the substantive law
of the arbitration. 92 The court thus concluded that the Mexican
courts were the only competent authorities to entertain an application
for annulment. 193
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals has also held that the only
courts that are competent to hear a motion to vacate a foreign arbitral
award are those in the country in which the arbitration took place, or
the courts of any country whose procedural law is specifically
invoked in the contract. 94 This Court stated:
[r]esorting to the courts of the nation supplying the substantive law for the
dispute does nothing to enhance the underlying principles of international
arbitration because, under the terms of the New York Convention itself,
190. Id. at 175.
191. Id. at 175-76.
192. International Standard Electric Corp. v. Bridas Sociedad Anonima Petrolera
Industrial y Commercia, 745 F. Supp. 172, 177 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
193. See id. at 178 (declaring that because Mexico was both the location of the
arbitration and country whose procedural law governed, only Mexican courts had
jurisdiction to vacate the arbitral award); see also Coutinho Caro & Co. U.S.A.,
Inc. v. Marcus Trading, Inc., Nos. 3:95CV2362 AWT, 3:96CV2218 AWT,
3:96CV2219 AWT, 2000 WL 435566, at *6-7 (D. Conn 2000) (finding the
International Standard Electric Corp. analysis persuasive and concluding that only
the courts of China had jurisdiction to vacate a CIETAC award rendered in China,
despite the fact that United States law governed the merits of the dispute).
194. See M&C Corp. v. Erwin Behr GMBH & Co., 87 F.3d 844, 848 (6th Cir.
1996) (following the decision in International Standard Electric Corp.). The
arbitration was held in England, while Michigan law governed the contract
disputes. Id. at 847-48.
389
AM. U. INT'L L. RE v.
judicial review of such an award is extremely limited and extends only to
procedural aspects of the determination.1
95
Courts in other countries have reached the same conclusion as
those in the U.S. For example, the Supreme Court of India held that
an award rendered in London, but subject to the procedural and
substantive laws of India, was domestic, and thus that the Indian
Arbitration Act of 1940 was the proper authority, not the
Convention.'96 The Indian Supreme Court stated that only an Indian
court had jurisdiction "to consider the validity or enforceability of
the arbitral award at issue in this case.' 97
Similarly, the Brussels Court of Appeals, in S.A. Mines, Minerais
et Metaux v. Mechema, Ltd., '9 rejected a petition to vacate an arbitral
award rendered in Paris, France. 99 The arbitration agreement
between the parties stated that the procedural rules for arbitration
would be those set forth in the parties' contract.200 The arbitral panel
held that because Paris was the arbitration venue, French arbitral law
governed all matters not provided for in the contract's procedural
rules.20 ' In dismissing the application for annulment, the Brussels
court noted the arbitrators' presumption that where the parties'
agreement was silent, the law of the arbitral situs would govern the
arbitral process. 2°2
Likewise, the French Court of Cassation denied an application for
vacatur when it determined that French procedural law did not apply
195. Id. at 848.
196. Oil and National Gas Commission v. Western Company of North America,
(India) 13 Y.B. COM. ARB. 473, 475-76 (1988).
197. Id. at 482.
198. 7 Y.B. COM. ARB. 316 (1982).
199. See id. at 317 (denying S.A. Mines' application to set aside the award based
on the reasoning that such an action may only be instituted in the country in which
the award has been made).
200. Id. at 316.
201. See id. at 316-17 (in the absence of an agreement between the parties, it is
generally accepted that the law of the country in which the arbitration occurs
governs the arbitral procedure).
202. Id. at 317.
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to an arbitration conducted in Brussels, Belgium.2 °3 The French
Supreme Court noted that the application for setting aside the award
is only proper if it is a national award and made according to French
procedural law.2°4 The court's decision rested on the fact that parties
could not have intended French procedural law to apply to the
arbitration because neither the parties nor the arbitral panel declared
French procedural law to be applicable. °5
With respect to a party choosing a procedural law that is different
than that of the territory in which the arbitration proceedings occur,
commentators have suggested that while the parties could
theoretically choose a procedural law different from that of the
arbitral situs, 06 the parties must be clear in making such a
selection. 207 The assumption against a procedural law other than local
law arises out of the rarity of such occurrences and the potential
conflicts and complexities that could arise in such cases-
particularly where the local law includes mandatory elements.0 8 In
Karaha Bodas, Pertamina argued that certain waivers of Indonesian
Civil Code provisions contained within the arbitration clause
203. See Maatschappij voor IndustrifIe Research en Ontwikkeling B.V. v. Henri
Li~vremont and M. Cominassi, (Fr), May 25, 1983, 12 Y.B. COM. ARB. 480, 482
(1987) (dismissing an application to set aside an arbitration award, due to the
inapplicability of French procedural law to the arbitration).
204. Id.at481.
205. See id. (discussing the French Court of Appeal's inquiry into the will of the
parties regarding the procedures and law applicable to their arbitration).
206. See, e.g., REDFERN & HUNTER, supra note 1, at 84 (noting that while
choosing a different procedural law is theoretically possible, it is also potentially
problematic).
207. See, e.g., Karaha Bodas V, 264 F. Supp. 2d at 481-82.
208. See REDFERN & HUNTER, supra note 1, at 84 (noting that such a choice
would complicate arbitration because the arbitral tribunal would have to consider
two sets of procedural laws-those chosen by the parties, and those of the territory
in which the arbitration occurs that are mandatory in that territory). Furthermore,
the courts in which recourse is sought might be reluctant to rule based on the
procedural law of another nation. Id. See also, e.g., S.A. Mines, 7 Y.B. COM. ARB.
316 (1982), at 317 (quoting the arbitrators' observation that it is a generally
accepted principle that the arbitral procedures of the country in which the
arbitration takes place apply, absent an express agreement to the contrary by the
parties).
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constituted an implied election of Indonesian procedural law. 219 It is
clear, however, that despite the fact that the JOC and ESC each
called for the application of Indonesian substantive law, Swiss law
was the chosen lex arbitri.2 " This is not only because the award was
rendered in Switzerland, but also because the parties did not make
clear that Indonesian arbitral law was to apply. 211 Evidence of the
arbitral proceedings further supports this conclusion; Pertamina not
only argued that Swiss law applied to the proceedings, but also
repeatedly referred to Swiss law in presenting its arguments to the
arbitral panel. 1 2 Pertamina did not argue that Indonesian law applied
to the proceedings either during the arbitration or in its appeal to the
Swiss courts. 213 Furthermore, in Pertamina's attempt to persuade the
Texas District Court to stay the enforcement proceeding pending the
Swiss appeal, Pertamina contended that Swiss arbitration law applied
and that the Swiss court had jurisdiction to hear the challenge.2 4
The Indonesian court, therefore, improperly intervened in the case
by applying the Convention to the annulment application filed by
Pertamina. Furthermore, the Indonesian court wrongly decided that it
was a "competent authority" to vacate the award.
B. THE INDONESIAN "ANNULMENT" VIOLATED LAW No. 30
The Indonesian decision was also in error because the court
premised its conclusions on a strained interpretation of Indonesian
law. First, as explained above, Law No. 30 provides only three
grounds for vacatur, none of which were satisfied in this instance.2 5
Second, contrary to the Jakarta court's assertion and as already
explained, the New York Convention does not supply "additional
209. Karaha Bodas V, 264 F. Supp. 2d at 481-82.
210. Id.at482.
211. Id.
212. Id. n.13. Pertamina had also argued that under Swiss law the arbitral panel
lacked jurisdiction, and that the arbitral panel did not have the power to consolidate
the proceedings under Swiss law. Id.
213. Id.
214. Karaha Bodas V, 264 F. Supp. 2d at 482.
215. See Indonesian Case, Judgment, 86/PDT.G/2002/PN.JKT.PST, at 22-23
(listing the Court's reasons for annulling the final Swiss award).
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grounds" upon which an award may be annulled; rather, it only
provides bases for enforcement refusal.216
Law No. 30 provides only three possible grounds for vacating an
award in Indonesia. 7 Courts may vacate an award: (1) if there is
proof that a party submitted false documents; (2) if the court finds
that key documents were withheld from the other party to the
arbitration; or (3) if one of the parties committed a fraudulent act
during the arbitral proceedings. 21 KBC argued before the Indonesian
court that Pertamina, in its application for annulment to the
Indonesian Court, presented absolutely no evidence satisfying any of
the three elements necessary to petition for annulment.21 9 Indeed,
Pertamina made no attempt to invoke any of the explicit grounds for
vacatur contained in Law No. 30.22o The court stepped around this
argument by relying upon the official Elucidation to Article 70 of
Law No. 30, which states that the "grounds on which to base a
petition for annulment of an arbitral award are, among others, as
stipulated in Article 70. ' ' 221 The Jakarta court held that "use of the
phrase 'among others' instead of 'namely' implies that the law
allows courts to apply legal grounds other than those specified in
Article 70. 1222 The court then noted that because Indonesia ratified
the Convention in 1981, Indonesian courts must directly apply its
provisions. According to the Court, Pertamina was not restricted in
its petition for annulment to Article 70 of Law No. 30, but could rely
directly on Article V of the New York Convention itself.223 In so
doing, the court confused the law applicable to the annulment of an
216. New York Convention, supra note 2, at art. VI; see Karaha Bodas V, 264
F. Supp. 2d at 477.
217. Law No. 30, supra note 56, art. 70.
218. Id.
219. Indonesian Case, Judgment, 86/PDT.G/2002/PN.JKT.PST, at 21-22.
220. See id. (holding that the legal basis for the claim can be found in the New
York Convention and Law No. 30).
221. Id. at 23.
222. Id.
223. See id. at 27 (noting that the award should not be enforced because it
contravened Article V(1)(b) of the New York Convention).
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award under domestic law with that applicable to an enforcement
action under the New York Convention.
A case where a U.S. court applied domestic law in an action to
vacate an international award sheds light on the subject of the
interaction between the Convention and domestic law applicable to
annulment proceedings.224 In examining a request for vacatur of an
award, the Second Circuit in Yusuf Ahmed Alghanim & Sons W.L.L.
v. Toys "R" Us, Inc.225 read Article V(1)(e) to allow the application
of domestic, U.S.-law grounds for vacatur to a non-domestic award
rendered in the United States.26 The court stated that "there appears
to be no dispute among [scholars and other signatories to the
Convention] that an action to set aside an international arbitral
award, as contemplated by Article V(1)(e), is controlled by the
domestic law of the rendering state. '227 The court further noted that
"the award can be set aside in the country of origin 2 8 on all grounds
contained in the arbitration law of that country, including public
policy of that country.12 29 The court concluded that "an action to set
aside an award can be brought only under the domestic law of the
arbitral forum, and can never be made under the Convention. '230
As discussed above, none of the express grounds for relief under
Indonesian arbitral law were satisfied, or even pleaded, in the
Karaha Bodas case. Faced with this reality, the court construed the
Convention's Article V grounds for refusal of enforcement as
224. Yusuf Ahmed Alghanim & Sons W.L.L. v. Toys "R" Us, Inc., 126 F.3d 15,
20 (2d Cir. 1997).
225. 126 F.3d 15 (2d Cir. 1997)
226. Id. at 21. The Convention was applicable because the award was found to
be "non-domestic," in that the dispute "involved two non-domestic parties and one
U.S. corporation, and principally involved conduct and contract performance in the
Middle East." Id. at 19.
227. Id. at 21.
228. Id. at 21 n.3.
229. See id. (noting that the grounds for setting aside the award under the
Convention may include "all kinds of particularities of the arbitration law of the
country of origin").
230. Toys "R" Us, Inc., 126 F.3d at 21, 22, citing Case No. 2 ND 502180 (Feb.
1, 1980) (Aus), excerpted in 7 Y.B. COMM. ARB. 312, 313 (1982).
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implied grounds for relief under Indonesian law. However,
Pertamina's argument and the court's analysis fail to consider that
even if the Convention could supplement domestic arbitration law,
nothing would be added in terms of grounds for vacatur: no grounds
for setting aside exist in the Convention.2 1 The Toys "R'" Us court
recognized that Article V(1)(e) allowed the application of domestic
law to vacate the award; and the court in fact used domestic law to
consider the application for annulment. The Indonesian court, on the
other hand, used domestic law to allow for the application of the
New York Convention to consider the application for annulment of
the Swiss Award. But while the New York Convention instructs
domestic courts to annul an award based on its domestic law, it stops
there.232 The court's determination that the Convention applied to an
action for annulment in Indonesia expanded an otherwise narrowly-
phrased national arbitration law to provide for vacatur on far wider
grounds.
The court's use of public policy as a ground for vacatur is one
example of this expansion. Specifically, the Indonesian court
considered Article V(2)(b) of the Convention,233 which states that
courts may deny the enforcement of an arbitral award if enforcement
would violate public policy of the place of enforcement.234 In
addition to Article V(2)(b) of the Convention, the court referred to
Indonesian Supreme Court Regulation No. 1 of 1999, which provides
that "the enforcement of foreign arbitral awards in Indonesia
imitatively applies to awards which do not violate public order in
terms of all underlying principles of the legal system and society in
231. See id. at 22-23 (finding that "while it would have provided greater
reliability to the enforcement of awards under the Convention had the available
grounds been defined in some way, such action would have constituted meddling
with national procedure for handling domestic awards, a subject beyond the
competence of the Conference"), quoted in Leonard V. Quigley, Accession by the
United States to the United Nations Convention on the Recognition and
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 70 YALE L.J. 1049, 1070 (1961).
232. See W. Laurence Craig, Some Trends and Developments in the Law and
Practice of International Commercial Arbitration, 30 TEX INT'L L.J. 1, 11.
233. Indonesian Case, Judgment, 86/PDT.G/2002/PN.JKT.PST at 27.
234. New York Convention, supra note 2, at art. V(2)(b).
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Indonesia. ' '235 Thus, the court, in using the grounds for refusal of
enforcement in place of those for annulment under Indonesian law,
considered the issue of "whether recognition or enforcement would
be in violation of public order. '236 The court ultimately concluded
that "the [Swiss Award should] be denied of [sic] recognition and
enforcement, since it is in violation of public order and the
underlying principles of the people of Indonesia. '2 37
Even if Indonesian law allows for the possibility of extra-statutory
grounds for vacatur,238 public policy does not appear to be such a
ground. 39 Indonesian law refers to public policy only with respect to
enforcement actions, not annulment actions.24 ° In other words, the
denial of recognition or enforcement based on public policy grounds
may have been acceptable only if Pertamina or KBC had petitioned
for recognition or enforcement of the Swiss Award before the court.
It is clear, both from the Indonesian court's reference to the
Convention and its continuous use of the terms "enforcement and
recognition" in its opinion, that the court confused the proceeding
before it as one of enforcement or recognition, as opposed to what it
really was-an annulment proceeding under domestic law.241
235. Indonesian Case, Judgment, 86/PDT.G/2002/PN.JKT.PST, at 26-27.
236. Id. at 26.
237. See id. at 27 (specifying that the court's decision that ordre public was
violated rested on its conclusion that since the Presidential Decrees were "aimed to
revive and overcome the country's financial condition, which was in the midst of
an economic and monetary crisis [and] such condition would be aggravated if the
geothermal project were to be continued, and it would further exacerbate the
Indonesian economy").
238. Such is the case, for example, under U.S. law, where nearly all jurisdictions
have accepted that awards may be set aside for "manifest disregard of law." See
Noah Rubins, Manifest Disregard of Law and Vacatur of Arbitral Awards in the
United States, 12 AM. REV. INT'L ARB. 363 (2001) (explaining that U.S. courts
apply additional non-statutory grounds for vacating of arbitration awards, the most
recognized being "manifest disregard of law").
239. Toys "R" Us, 126 F.3d at 23.
240. 1990 REGULATION, supra note 43 (noting that the Central Jakarta District
Court is empowered to respond to matters dealing with the enforcement of foreign
arbitral awards); see also Law No. 30, supra note 56, art. 66.
241. Indonesian Case, Judgment, 86/PDT.G/2002/PN.JKT.PST, at 28-29.
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In drafting national arbitration laws, many nations have closely
followed the provisions of the UNCITRAL Model Law on
International Commercial Arbitration, in particular concerning the
proper grounds for vacatur. As explained above, Indonesia chose a
different route,242 adopting significantly narrower grounds than those
found in the UNCITRAL Model Law. The Indonesian legislature
most likely took this approach to setting aside awards in Law No. 30
in an effort to compete with other jurisdictions as a center for
international arbitration, since including only three limited bases for
annulment (largely related to fraud on the arbitrators) could be seen
to increase predictability and finality in international commercial
disputes.243
Ironically, the Karaha Bodas decision suggests that Indonesia may
have adopted an arbitration law with grounds for annulment (and
enforcement, for that matter) that are too narrow to be of practical
use. By allowing judicial review of awards only in rare
circumstances of fraud, the 1999 Law effectively closes off a "safety
valve" carefully preserved in the Model Law.2 "
In a country with a more developed judicial system, such tightly-
circumscribed scope of review might well prove attractive to
242. See Drahozal, supra note 174, at 456 (noting that many national arbitration
laws follow the UNCITRAL Model Law, which includes the New York grounds
for non-enforcement of awards). The Model Law tracks New York Convention
Article V's list of grounds that permit courts to refuse enforcement of awards, with
the exception of Article V(1)(e). Id. By doing so, in the countries that have adopted
the Model Law, grounds for annulment are nearly the same as grounds for refusal
of enforcement under the Convention. Id.
243. See id. at 458 (noting that countries compete for international arbitration
business, thus implementing arbitration proceedings that may seem favourable to
parties). Compare Samuel A. Hobold, Opting Out of the U.S. Legal System: The
Case for International Arbitration, 10 INT'L L. PRACTiCUM 43, 44 (1997) (stating
that "[m]ost parties who elect to arbitrate rather than litigate do so because they
want finality."), and William H. Knull, III & Noah D. Rubins, Betting the Farm on
International Arbitration: Is it Time to Offer an Appeal Option?, 11 AM. REv.
INT'L ARB. 531, 536 (2000) (asserting that "for most parties to large-scale
international arbitration, finality is at best a secondary advantage").
244. See supra notes 160-161 and accompanying text (explaining the Model
Law's provisions on enforcement and annulment of awards).
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contracting parties who value the finality of awards.245 But in a
country such as Indonesia, historically hostile to international
arbitration and with a judiciary notoriously vulnerable to outside
influence, eliminating legitimate and precisely-tailored grounds for
annulment or non-recognition may tempt judges to take the law into
their own hands, as they did in Karaha Bodas.24 6 Adopting the Model
Law provisions on recognition, enforcement, and annulment, which
would include acceptance of public policy and excess of powers
defenses, would at least reassure Indonesian courts that they can
adhere closely to the statutory text without threatening fundamental
national interests or enforcing awards rendered outside the scope of
the parties' submission.247 It is unlikely that even the Model Law
would have saved the Karaha Bodas award from an Indonesian
vacatur, given the political sensitivity of the matter and the courts'
determination to find for Pertamina at all costs. But the Jakarta
court's departure from its legislative foundation may have set a
precedent in Indonesia that undermines all the ostensible advances of
the 1999 Law.
IV. RECENT INDONESIAN CASES
Since the Jakarta District Court heard the Karaha Bodas case,
anecdotal evidence suggests that some progress is being made to
standardize the review and enforcement of foreign arbitration
awards. Research conducted at the Central Jakarta District Court in
January 2002 indicates that for the period between September 2000
and December 2001, four foreign awards were registered, and all
were subsequently approved for enforcement. To be sure, these
245. See generally Knull and Rubins, supra note 243, at 536-543 (discussing the
importance and attraction of finality in international arbitration). It should not be
assumed that all parties value finality above all else-studies indicate that many
businesspeople fear arbitration precisely because of the lack of recourse against
erroneous awards. Id.
246. See supra notes 87-132 and accompanying text (analyzing the Indonesian
Court's decision to annul the Swiss award in the Karaha Bodas case).
247. See Knull & Rubins, supra note 243, at 544 (outlining the provisions on
recognition, enforcement, and annulment of the Model law and the new York
Convention and noting that most modem statutes correspond to these limited
grounds for setting aside international awards).
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arbitration awards appear to be relatively minor in size and of little
political importance (unlike Himpurna2 "8 and Karaha Bodas). These
cases can serve as evidence that the Indonesian enforcement system
is not wholly beyond repair.
In PT. Wahana Adhireksa Wiraswasta v. Cocoa Merchants'
Association of America, Inc., the Central District Court of Jakarta
considered an award rendered on October 26, 1999, registered with
the Court on July 18, 2001, and approved for enforcement in
September 2001 .249 The District issued a warning letter on September
5, 2000 to the respondent, instructing it to pay the award.
The London Court of International Arbitration ("LCIA") award in
Oceanis Shipping Limited v. Mrs. R. Adji A. Suryo Di Puro was
issued on November 4, 1998, and registered at the District Court on
February 15, 2001. The court issued approval for enforcement a mere
two months later.25 0 According to the District Court record, the
claimant later enforced the award swiftly and successfully by
obtaining a writ of confiscation and selling seized property by
auction in August 2001.
An award of the Korean Commercial Arbitration Board was at
issue in Son, Han-Pil (representative of Dong San Machine Co.) v.
Herman Tanuraharja. Here, the claimant registered the award at the
District Court in February 2001, and obtained approval for
enforcement in April of the same year. 25' By September, the claimant
had received a writ of confiscation against the Indonesian
respondent.
Finally, in Balmac International Inc. v. Firma Sinar Nusantara,
the claimant arrived in Jakarta with a November 2000 award issued
by the Cocoa Merchants Association of America. The award was
registered at the District Court on April 11, 2001. The Court was
248. Himpurna California Energy Ltd. v. PT (Persero) Perusahaan Listruik
Negara, UNCITRAL Award of May 4, 1999, 14 MEALEY'S INT'L ARB. REP., A1
(Dec. 1999) (awarding Himpuna $391,711,652).
249. Decree No. 143/2000/Eks., September 4, 2001.
250. Decree No. 35/2001/Eks, April 16, 2001.
251. Decree No. 025/2001/Eks, April 18, 2001.
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even speedier in this case, confirming the award in May 2002.252 On
June 25, 2001, the District Court issued a confiscation writ for the
award.253
It is encouraging that the District Court of Central Jakarta has been
willing to approve all of the awards registered for enforcement and
also to support their implementation. This may perhaps indicate a
slowly changing attitude by the court, where traditionally it has
tended to reject enforcement on the grounds that enforcement of
foreign arbitral awards would disturb public order. It remains to be
seen whether this pattern will continue where the respondent is an
Indonesian State-owned company, or where the amount in dispute is
as large as it was in Karaha Bodas.
CONCLUSION
Ultimately, the Jakarta District Court's alleged annulment of the
Karaha Bodas award will do little service to Pertamina or to
Indonesia as a whole. Pertamina, as an oil and gas company of global
scale, can hardly stash its assets away within Indonesia's borders; its
futile and ill-advised end-run around the New York Convention has
only serviced to tarnish the company's reputation. As for Indonesia,
there can be no doubt that it has squandered an opportunity to wipe
the slate clean with Law No. 30. Although progress now seems
underway to confirm and enforce arbitral awards according to the
terms of the arbitration act, it may take a very long time to repair the
reputational damage done to Indonesia's judiciary.
Adopting the UNCITRAL Model Law is by no means the only
way to achieve a predictable arbitration regime that allows
businesspeople to control political risk and get on with driving
economic growth. But Law No. 30 suffers from serious weaknesses,
and should be amended accordingly. Even if Law No. 30 were
perfect, however, its implementation must always rely on a well-
working, independent judiciary. This Indonesia still does not have.
The Himpurna case showed that Jakarta is not an appropriate venue
for international arbitration; Karaha Bodas proved that moving the
252. Decree No. 44/2001/Eks and No. 45/2001/Eks, May 1, 2001.
253. Id. at 1-2.
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proceedings elsewhere may not help matters. There are those who
believe that where there is oil and gas, Western investors and traders
will come, regardless of the political risks. This is difficult to believe.
At least for now, foreign business has choices as to where to place its
capital. Unless Indonesia reforms its courts and its arbitration law, it
may find itself losing out to the competition.
The Jakarta court's decision was arbitrary and illegitimate, and
undermined stability and predictability by bending the law to fit
Pertamina's interests." 4 In future, Indonesian courts would be well-
advised against giving any credibility or weight to the annulment
decision in enforcement and vacatur cases under the Convention and
Law No. 30. Even this is merely a superficial solution to a deeper
problem, however. Even if courts disregard the Karaha Bodas
annulment decision, a long-term solution is required to re-establish
trust in Jakarta as an arbitral situs. Inadequacies in both the law and
those that implement it must be addressed before the international
business community will view Indonesia as a country committed to
the impartial and fair resolution of international commercial
disputes. 5 The development and stability of the Indonesian economy
may hang in the balance.256
254. See supra discussion Part IV A-B (providing the flaws of the Indonesian
decision to annul the award in Karaha Bodas case).
255. Mulyana & Schaefer, Critical Assessment, supra note 33, at 66.
256. Id. at 49.
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